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Abstract—The article presents a method of analysis of market-
based models for resource allocation in communication net-
works. It consists of several stages: classiﬁcation of a market
model, generation of input data, data adaptation to a tested
model, test calculations and, ﬁnally, presentation and inter-
pretation of results. A set of general criteria to assess vari-
ous models has been proposed. Tests are run using dedicated
computer applications, data is stored in open XML-based for-
mat originated in the multicommodity market model. Network
topologies are derived from the SNDlib library.
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1. Introduction
A dominant form of trading on the market of resources in
telecommunications networks is bilateral contracting. Time
of negotiations is undesirably long in relation to high dy-
namics of business processes in the telecommunications
market. In addition, the bilateral nature of negotiations re-
duces the transparency of trade rules. This often enables
network operators or service providers with signiﬁcant mar-
ket power to obtain better trading conditions than it is jus-
tiﬁed. Therefore, the research is conducted on innovative
mechanisms for trading of transport resources in networks
to enhance the eﬃciency of their usage and the quality of
conditions of competing for them, particularly in the form
of auctions and exchanges. Potential beneﬁts of the intro-
duction of such multilateral trading patterns on the mar-
ket for telecommunications network capacity are discussed
in [1], problems of the organization of network bandwidth
exchanges are presented in [2].
The variety of possible models and their variants creates
a problem of objective evaluation and the feasibility of
mutual comparison. The models may implement many
diﬀerent resource allocation algorithms and apply multi-
ple optimization criteria taking into account economic and
technical constraints. The chances of a simple quantitative
assessment of one model in comparison to others and indi-
cating its advantages and disadvantages are hindered. This
paper is an attempt to develop a methodological approach
to testing and comparing models of market-based allocation
of capacity in communication networks. The method can
be helpful in choosing trade models adequate to speciﬁc
markets segments in the telecommunications sector.
The structure of the article is as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy
describes the survivable network design library (SNDlib)
and the multicommodity market model (M3 ). Section 3
shows the successive stages of testing. Section 4 presents
a set of comparative criteria. Section 5 shows an example
of the application of the proposed framework for a selected
bandwidth trading model. Section 6 summarizes the results
of the research.
2. A Method of Analysis
of Market-Based Models
The proposed approach to evaluating market models results
in a multi-stage framework. The stages, shown in Fig. 1,
are as follows:
– model classiﬁcation,
– test data generation,
– data adaptation for a model,
– running tests,
– output data analysis.
Each step can be performed independently, using separate
tools. Data passed between the successive stages is stored
in text ﬁles saved in a extensible markup language (XML)-
based format.
Fig. 1. Schema of the bandwidth model testing framework.
The proposed methodology integrates the results of other
research: the data of the SNDlib and the model of a mul-
ticommodity market process (M3 ).
2.1. The SNDlib Library
The survivable ﬁxed telecommunication network design
library [3] is a scientiﬁc library sharing exemplary data
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for problems of the design/dimensioning of communication
transport networks.
Examples stored in the library reﬂect the topology of real
networks. All of them are saved in a standardized XML
dialect. The main purpose of the library is to collect ac-
tual data on research problems and create a platform for
exchange of information between scientists and engineers
involved in network design. The library comprises network
topologies with the structure of network links and band-
width demands, best solutions and their dual bounds, an
up-to-date bibliography and a list of conferences on the
subject. The scope of solving methods is broad and in-
cludes models of linear/integer programming, branch-and-
bound algorithms, column generation, a Lagrangian relax-
ation and meta-heuristics such as evolutionary algorithms,
simulated annealing or taboo search.
2.2. The M3 Model
Consistent description of a broad scope of potential trade
processes on the bandwidth market needs an application of
an adequately ﬂexible information model. Such ﬂexibility
and a high degree of openness can be obtained by using
an information model based on the M3 [4]. The M3 is a set
of formal models that describe data and communication
messages on multi-commodity infrastructure markets. The
M3model has been adopted in our research for a market of
transport resources in telecommunication networks.
The M3model enables a generic description of the trad-
ing information exchanged between market participants.
The data is stored in a special M3-XML dialect allow-
ing the expression of: the existing network infrastructure,
the time scale in which the trade is accomplished, the en-
tity structure (sellers, buyers, brokers, leaseholders, etc.),
the trade object structure (description of traded goods) and
the oﬀers submitted by individual market participants. It
contains, in particular, descriptions of market oﬀers: ele-
mentary (singlecommodity), integrated (multicommodity),
and also grouping: describing more complex relations be-
tween elementary commodities or integrated oﬀers with
common conditions or resource constraints. The introduc-
tion of the mechanism of grouping of the oﬀers facilitates
the formulation of non-trivial constraints for each indi-
vidual market participant, and proper valuation/quoting of
the oﬀers.
In practical applications one may use all or just selected
elements of the M3 data model. It is worth noting that the
M3model and its M3-XML data format do not specify how
the trade itself and the allocation of resources are realized.
3. Stages of Preparing and Running
Tests
This section presents the sequential stages of preparation
and runnig tests of bandwidth market models.
3.1. Classification of the Model
The properties of models originate in economics, game the-
ory principles of mechanism design and in technical fea-
tures of traded bandwidth. Selecting distinctive features
of the models creates a space for their classiﬁcation and
grouping. The set of the classifying features have been
developed upon analysis of the network resource structure
and the organization of trade processes. The categories of
the network design problems from [3] have also been taken
into account.
Type of commodities. The number of types of resources
in telecommunication networks is signiﬁcant: there are
many technologies used in transmission systems (switch-
ing and multipexing techniques). The resources can have
a physical or a virtual nature and their detailed speciﬁcation
depends on a layered architecture of modern networks.
Our research is focused on transport communication net-
works and in this context the general elementary commod-
ity is a bandwidth of a point-to-point connection between
a pair of nodes in a speciﬁed network layer. It is deﬁned as
a network capacity enabling transmission of speciﬁed data
amount from a source node to a destination node during
speciﬁed quantum of time.
The bandwidth of a network link can be oﬀered for sell.
The bandwidth needed to serve a traﬃc demand can be
purchased – the existence of a direct connection between
the pair of nodes of the demand is not necessary, the de-
mand can be realized with one or more paths (consisting
of sequences of links).
The trade models can take into account many of character-
istic features of bandwidth commodities. The most signiﬁ-
cant ones are following:
– direction of bandwidth: bandwidth commodities can
be directed, undirected (data ﬂow is possible in both
directions) or asymmetric (capacity depends on the
direction of data ﬂow); bidirectional bandwidth com-
modities can be modeled with two oppositely directed
commodities;
– divisibility of bandwidth: bandwidth can be fully
divisible, modular (divisible with the accuracy of
units), unit (a particular case of modular bandwidth
modeled in combinatorial auctions), predeﬁned (di-
visible only within speciﬁed volumes);
– commodity structure: some trade models omit struc-
tural relations between commodities and concern
trading only separate elementary commodities; other
models enable trading complex structures of com-
modities, particularly on the demand side: the struc-
tures can refer to a set of predeﬁned network paths,
a speciﬁed set of network links or whole subnetworks
(e.g., for purposes of building virtual private net-
works).
Relations between oﬀers and commodities. The models
can take into account diﬀerent kinds of assignment between
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traded commodities and related trade oﬀers. One can dis-
tinguish:
– elementary oﬀers: a single oﬀer concerns a single
elementary commodity;
– bundled oﬀers: a single oﬀer concerns a bundle of
elementary commodities, the commodities can be
sold/bought in equal or diﬀerent amounts.
Market participants. The models can describe many or-
ganizational forms of trade. The basic division takes into
consideration the number and the roles of market partici-
pants. One can distinguish:
– single-side models: a market operator sell bandwidth
capacity to its clients, or a single client buys services
from many competing network operators;
– double-sided models: there are many buyers and sel-
lers.
The important role in trade models is a market operator –
the entity that balances the market: allocates resources and
sets prices. In centralized models there is one market op-
erator. In distributed models there can be many of them.
Quality of service constraints. Market contracts concern-
ing telecommunication resources usually deﬁne a set of pa-
rameters describing the quality of service (QoS). The trade
models can take those constraints into account, e.g., spec-
ifying the maximal length of a path or the maximal delay
of a packet.
Resource allocation rule. The network resources are al-
located by means of a deﬁned algorithm operating on the
available market oﬀers. In the context of transport network
resources one can distinguish the basic allocation rules:
– path setting: the required point-to-point bandwidth
connections are served with paths consisting of a se-
quence of communication links;
– allocation of single resources: buy oﬀers concern
separate resources that is not bundled without any
explicitly expressed relation.
Pricing rule. Market models set contract prices according
to a speciﬁed rule. Some popular examples of such rules
are: English auction, second-price auction, Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves auction, dual pricing, etc.
Exchanged messages. The essential feature of a trade
model is the type of signals exchanged between market
participants and a market operator. The signals can have
various forms:
– point characteristics: a traditional market oﬀer indi-
cating commodities, their amounts and oﬀer prices;
– partial characteristics of preferences, e.g., a set of
points from utility function or a stepwise oﬀer;
– full characteristics of preferences, e.g., in the form of
an utility function.
Market balancing dynamics. The models can be divided
according to the time schedule of the market balancing
process. One can distinguish two basic classes:
– one-time auctions: market participants submit their
oﬀers and then a market operator allocates resources
and sets prices taking into account all submitted of-
fers;
– iterated auctions: the ﬁnal market balance is achieved
in a sequence of steps, in which market participants
can modify their signals submitted to a market.
Implementation. The models can be implemented with
many diﬀerent techniques and tools originated in opera-
tions research, computer programming and mathematics.
Examples of the implementation types are following: linear
programming, mathematical programming, dynamic pro-
gramming, parametric equations, heuristics, etc.
3.2. Input Data Generation
One of the purposes of the research presented in this pa-
per is to create a library of test examples for the scientiﬁc
community involved in the design of market algorithms and
models for communication transport networks. Input data
for test cases should reﬂect the size of demand and supply
observable in the real network bandwidth market. The test
data used for the research may come from the following
sources:
– examples of network design problems;
– economic models of supply and demand;
– real data from the telecommunications market.
Trade patterns for transport resources of networks and bal-
ancing market oﬀers are conceptually similar to the prob-
lems of network design – the relationship between trade
mechanisms and designing the network have been discussed
in [5]: the demand for network bandwidth and communi-
cation links between nodes can be interpreted as a market
oﬀer to buy/sell network resources. In order to generate
a test network topology and market oﬀers one can therefore
use the data from the SNDlib library. The examples from
the database cannot be used directly due to their important
constraints. Firstly, there is only one link between pairs of
nodes in a network topology, while the market models as-
sume the existence of multiple oﬀers on the bandwidth seg-
ment between a pair of nodes (a similar requirement applies
also to buy oﬀers). Secondly, any pricing information in
the examples of the SNDlib is only expressed by determin-
ing the cost of installation and expansion of links, while in
the trade models one requires the price of bids submitted by
buyers and sellers. All the missing elements can be added
to the original network design examples, e.g., by means
of the pseudo-random generation adjusted to the speciﬁc
test case.
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The second source of the data on the potential oﬀers on the
bandwidth market is the use of economic models of sup-
ply and demand. Such models in the context of resources
in telecommunication networks are under research, espe-
cially in the ﬁeld of modeling network traﬃc and demand
for services. Some analysis of supply and demand can be
transferred to the ground of telecommunications from other
infrastructure markets such as energy or transportation.
The test data can also come from the analysis of the actual
data on transactions accomplished in the real telecommuni-
cations market. Acquiring such data is diﬃcult in practice
because there are not any network bandwidth exchanges op-
erating on a larger scale, and the information about bilateral
contracts between telecommunications companies is gener-
ally private and not publicly available. However, there are
some internet sites showing examples of bandwidth prices
in certain local markets, e.g., the U.S., and reports on global
trends in the development of the telecommunications mar-
ket, such as the work [6].
3.3. Data Adaptation – Conversion to M3 Format
The adopted information model for the framework is the
M3 – any data of test cases should be saved in the M3-
XML format. This can be achieved in two ways.
The ﬁrst one is the direct generation of input data in the
desired format. This requires dedicated computer tools al-
lowing editing or automatic generation of the test data.
The second approach assumes the use of examples con-
tained in the SNDlib library enriched with the entity struc-
ture, the object structure and trade oﬀers. Choosing an
XML dialect as a data format results in the opportunity
to use widely available read/write software libraries for
many programming languages, which facilitate the develop-
ment of new tools for test data generation. The natural way
to transform XML data into another format is the use of
a extensible stylesheed language transformation (XSLT) [7].
One can also use the query language XQuery [8].
For the purpose of this research a mixed approached has
been adopted. A dedicated computer program with a graph-
ical user interface has been designed and implemented. It
has been used to enrich the SNDlib examples with lacking
elements and save them in the simple dedicated bandwidth
market XML (BM-XML) format describing the network
nodes and the oﬀers for sale and purchase of network ca-
pacity. A series of XSLT transformations processing the
BM-XML format into M3-XML format have been used. In
this way we have obtained a convenient set of computer
tools used for importing and converting examples of net-
work topology to the new library of complete test cases for
bandwidth market models.
3.4. Running Tests
The next step is to run required calculations of network
capacity allocation and pricing for a tested model with
the prepared data. It is assumed that all the input data
is stored in the M3-XML format. Therefore any market
mechanism, which is a subject to the tests, should be able
to read input data and generate output data compatible with
the M3 information model. The ﬂow of data during the ex-
ecution of the tests is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. M3-XML format data ﬂow in running tests.
The concept of a universal decisional-computational pro-
cessor has been developed [9] and the initial implementa-
tion has been made: it solves the tasks described by the data
stored in M3-XML format. The corresponding XSLT trans-
formation converts the data to the internal representation of
the appropriate model. The processor returns the data in the
M3-XML format. Such modular architecture allows inde-
pendent implementation of the trade models from the eval-
uation framework: compatibility with the M3 information
model can be achieved by the input and output interfaces.
The XSLT transformations can be applied to convert the in-
put data into the format required by the particular comput-
ing processor, e.g., a standard mathematical programming
solver or a dedicated implementation of the algorithm of
a trade model. Examples of such transformations have al-
ready been created [4] and they are further extended in our
research on new trading models. They convert the data in
M3-XML format into GMPL format (gnumath program-
ming language) [10], which can be used by optimization
solvers, e.g., GlpSol and AMPL (a mathematical program-
ming language). Linear models can also be easily con-
verted to other LP (linear programming) formats, e.g., the
one used by the CPLEX solver.
3.5. Analysis of Output Data
The next step to take after having completed series of com-
putational experiments is to analyze the obtained results.
The application of the M3 information model to describe
the output of the tested models facilitates the analysis. If
one had diﬀerent data formats for various trade models the
comparison of the results would be much more diﬃcult and
time-consuming. The adopted XML-based format allows
for simple data conversion to other formats for presentation
purposes, such as exporting to spreadsheets or graphical
visualization applications.
4. Comparative Criteria
A fundamental part of the evaluation framework is the
proper selection of indicators. Trade models are often de-
signed for a speciﬁc market context and deﬁned aspects
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of resource allocation, so the comparative criteria should
be general enough to be applicable to most of them. We
propose a set of such indicators, they represent measures
originating in economics, game theory and technical eﬃ-
ciency.
A properly designed trade model should strive to meet sev-
eral desirable properties that make it attractive for a wide
range of market participants (traders, decision makers, reg-
ulators). These properties can be used as evaluation criteria
providing information about the ”quality” of a given model.
The set of criteria is divided into three categories: global,
individual and technical. The division into the individual
and global ones expresses the natural market game between
individual participants’ interests and global interests. The
third category aims in evaluation of the models in terms of
their technical eﬃciency.
4.1. Global Criteria
Economic eﬃciency. The main measure of economic ef-
ﬁciency is the market surplus. It is deﬁned as the aggre-
gated economic beneﬁts derived from the market exchange
of goods. If the market mechanism encourages participants
to submit truthful bids, then economic prosperity could be
determined accurately using actual bids. If the market oﬀer
does not comply with the participant’s preference proﬁle, it
can be used only as an imprecise measure known as eco-
nomic beneﬁts. It is the diﬀerence between total value of
goods purchased and the total value of goods sold on the
market, as follows:
Q = ∑
m∈B
dmem −∑
l∈S
plsl , (1)
where em is the unit oﬀer price of buy oﬀer m, dm is realized
bandwidth of buy oﬀer m, sl is the unit oﬀer price of sell
oﬀer l, and pl is realized bandwidth of sell oﬀer l.
Incentive compatibility. The incentive compatibility prop-
erty holds if no market participant has incentives to report
signal diﬀerent from its type/preferences: no agent has in-
centives to report an untruthful oﬀer.
Incentive compatible mechanism prevents strategic actions
of the participants. The measure of the eﬀectiveness of
the mechanism against strategic players is the allocative
ineﬃciency (AI) deﬁned as follows:
AI =
Q0−Q
Q0 100% , (2)
where Q0 is the economic surplus if every market partici-
pant submits a truthful bid, Q is the actual (achieved) value
of the economic welfare, where participants can submit bids
incompatible with their preferences. It should be noted that
the participants may submit bids incompatible with their
proﬁle of preferences in order to achieve higher proﬁts.
Budget balance. A trade model has balanced budget if sum
of sellers’ expenses is equal to sum of buyers’ incomes:
there is no need to surcharge the trading mechanism, and
the mechanism does not earn additional proﬁts.
The ﬁrst quantitative measure describing this criterion is
the value of the diﬀerence between total sellers’ income SI
and total buyers’ expense BE related to the total market
value. This measure has got the term budget imbalance in
relation to total turnover (RBIT ):
RBIT =
SI−BE
SI + BE
100% . (3)
The second measure describing the budget balance criterion
is the value of the diﬀerence between total sellers’ income
and total buyers’ expense related to the market surplus.
This measure has got the term budget imbalance in relation
to market surplus (RBIS):
RBIS = SI−BEQ 100% . (4)
Pareto-eﬃciency. The results given by the trading model
are Pareto-eﬃcient, if one can not improve the result for one
market participant without making some other participants
worse oﬀ: the results are Pareto-eﬃcient if such results are
not Pareto-dominated by other results.
4.2. Individual Criteria
Individual economic beneﬁts. From the perspective of an
individual market participant the trading model should al-
low to obtain the highest possible value of the individual
economic beneﬁts. The measure is deﬁned as the value of
the individual utility function for each market participant.
Absolute individual fairness – individual rationality.
A trade model is individually rational, if no market partici-
pant loses from the participation in the trade. This property
is also called the voluntary participation (if it may lose then
it can choose not to participate in the trade).
Relative individual fairness. A trade model is fair in a rel-
ative sense, when from the perspective of each participant
no other oﬀer is favored in relation to its oﬀer.
Other criteria related to fairness have been outlined below:
– anonymity: a participant remains anonymous if
renumbering of participants does not aﬀect the ob-
tained outcome;
– symmetry: two participants with the same parame-
ters, in the same market situation (the same utility
functions) should obtain the same individual results;
– an equal price: each participant receives the same
volume of a commodity for the same unit price.
4.3. Technical Efficiency
The possibility of a practical technical implementation of
the trade model is evaluated with technical eﬃciency indi-
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cators dependent on the computational complexity of the
model and on its reliability. Exemplary measures are:
– duration of single market balancing;
– total duration of the market balancing (for iterative
mechanisms);
– a number of exchanged messages (total, average).
5. Example
The evaluation framework has been applied to test the bal-
ancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT) model dis-
cussed in [5]. It is a multicommodity trade model for the
market of network transport resources with many buyers
and many sellers. The model assumes complete divisi-
bility of oﬀered bandwidth (sell oﬀers) and the ability to
allocate any fraction of bandwidth to any bandwidth de-
mand (buy oﬀers). The market balancing process consists
of setting the paths serving buy oﬀers with a combination
of sell oﬀers. The formal format of the model is a linear
programming problem representing a double auction with
the maximization of market welfare.
The evaluation of the properties of the BCBT model has
been carried out according to the framework principles out-
lined in the paper. Below a brief description of this test
case is presented.
5.1. Classification of the Model
Type of commodities. The BCBT model assumes that
both links (sell oﬀers) and paths (buy oﬀers) concern uni-
directional network capacity. The division model of the
oﬀered bandwidth is continuous: the seller and buyer may
indicate bandwidth amount of their bids with any positive
real number. The bandwidth can be traded in the range
from 0 to a maximal admissible volume speciﬁed for the
oﬀers.
Relations between oﬀers and commodities. All market
oﬀers in the model are elementary oﬀers concerning ele-
mentary point-to-point bandwidth connections in the net-
work.
Market participants. The model represents a double auc-
tion: there are many buyers and many sellers. It is a cen-
tralized trading model – a single market operator balances
the market.
Quality of service constraints. There are not any QoS
parameters included in the model (e.g., there is no limit on
the maximum length of paths).
Resource allocation rule. The balancing mechanism can
freely allocate bandwidth in the network, in particular a sin-
gle sell oﬀer can be used to serve multiple buy oﬀers, a sin-
gle buy oﬀer can be realized with many paths. There are
no restrictions on the possibility of setting paths in the net-
work: there are no predeﬁned paths, they are set during
the market balancing process taking into account of all
available oﬀers.
Pricing rule. The pricing rule adopted is the dual pricing
rule – it is based on dual prices of the balance constraints.
In the BCBT model the balance constraints exist only for
the links – so the prices are determined directly for the
sell oﬀers only. The prices for demands (buy oﬀers) are
determined as a sum of the values of bandwidth bought on
links in the related paths.
Exchanged messages. The messages exchanged in the
model are point characteristics of market participants’ pref-
erences in the form of a traditional oﬀer expressing the
amount of commodities and their unit prices.
Market balancing dynamics. The model is an example of
a one-time double auction – the market participants sub-
mit oﬀers and then the market is balanced – resources are
allocated and prices are calculated.
Implementation. The model has been implemented as
a linear program maximizing total market welfare. The
linear program is written in GMPL and AMPL.
5.2. Input Data
The network topology is derived from the example of the
NOBEL-EU network from the SNDlib developed in the
IST NOBEL project “Next Generation Optical Networks
for Broadband European Leadership” [11]. The nodes of
the network are located in 28 major European cities. The
network topology (nodes and potential links) is illustrated
in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Pan-European network of EU project IST NOBEL [11].
Bandwidth buy oﬀers are independent from the traﬃc de-
mands included in the original SNDlib example. It is as-
sumed that the oﬀered prices rise along with the geo-
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graphical distance between a pair of nodes, and oﬀered
bandwidth capacity decreases with the distance. 150 buy
oﬀers have been generated by the following algorithm:
1. Draw randomly a source and a destination network
node (diﬀerent from each other).
2. Set pseudo-randomly oﬀer price according to the ex-
pression (5) with dependency on the geographical
distance between the nodes:
Gauss
(
AvgP ·Dist, AvgP3Dist
)
. (5)
3. Set pseudo-randomly oﬀer bandwidth capacity ac-
cording to the expression (6) with dependency on
the geographical distance between the nodes:
Uniform
(
0.5AvgC, 1.5AvgC
)(
1− Dist
Distmax
)
(6)
with the following denotation:
– Gauss(a,b): Gaussian distribution with the expected
value a and the standard deviation b;
– Uniform(a,b): uniform distribution in the range
[a,b];
– AvgP: average unit bandwidth price related to a unit
distance;
– AvgC: average bandwidth capacity for adjacent
nodes (distance equals 0);
– Dist: distance between nodes;
– Distmax: the maximal distance between the nodes in
the network.
Following parameter values has been used for buy oﬀer
generation: AvgP = 1, AvgC = 15.
Sell oﬀers have been also generated randomly (they have
replaced links in the original SNDlib example: the pri-
mary links have been interpreted as bandwidth segments
on which sell oﬀers are submitted). The assumption made
is similar to the case of buy oﬀers: the oﬀered prices
rise along with the geographical distance between a pair
of nodes, and oﬀered bandwidth capacity decreases with
the distance. 5 separate sell oﬀers have been generated
on every bandwidth segment using the same mathematical
expression for setting prices and capacities as for the buy
oﬀers (with the following parameter values: AvgP = 0.5,
AvgC = 10) according to the algorithm:
1. Set pseudo-randomly the direction of the oﬀer (the
probability of each direction equals 0.5).
2. Set pseudo-randomly oﬀer price according to the ex-
pression (5) with dependency on the geographical
distance between the nodes.
3. Set pseudo-randomly oﬀer bandwidth capacity ac-
cording to the expression (6) with dependency on
the geographical distance between the nodes.
The test data generated for the Nobel-EU network including
150 buy oﬀers and 205 sell oﬀers has been saved in a BM-
XML format ﬁle. The data sat is a simple but complete
test case, and it can be used also for testing the properties
of other models than the BCBT.
5.3. Adaptation and Running Tests
A single test procedure consists of three phases. The ﬁrst
one is the adaptation of the data stored in BM-XML format
to the M3-XML format. The second phase is the solution
of the problem in accordance with a given mathematical
model of the BCBT. The third phase is the collection of
the results and their analysis. The detailed description of
each step is as follows:
• The data in the BM-XML format has been converted
to the M3 information model using several XSLT
transformations. The result of this procedure is a set
of ﬁles in the M3-XML format.
• The obtained data set is then passed to the decisional-
computational processor performing the following
steps: the data is converted to a GMPL model imple-
menting the BCBT allocation model using an XSLT
transformation; the complete GMPL model with nu-
meric data is passed to a linear programming solver
(e.g., AMPL, GlpSol) returning results.
• The results are parsed to the M3-XML format.
Calculations have been performed on a PC (Intel Core 2
Duo 2.60 GHz, 2 GB RAM).
5.4. Output Data Analysis
The numerical data and short comments for the framework
indicators have been presented below.
Economic eﬃciency. From a global perspective the BCBT
model is economically eﬃcient in the sense that it maxi-
mizes the global economic welfere. Thus, for given market
oﬀers, no better allocation of bandwidth resources is possi-
ble. The market welfare achieved in the test case is 13861.
Incentive compatibility. The obtained value of the alloca-
tive ineﬃciency equals 0.026. It is a very good outcome –
it indicates that the possibility for speculation on the market
is limited.
Budget balance. The RBIT and RBIS benchmarks are 0, so
the model fulﬁlls the requirements for the budget balance
property.
Pareto-eﬃciency. The Pareto-eﬃciency property holds for
the family of BCBT models. Pareto-eﬃciency is ensured if
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the aggregation function of the individual objective func-
tions is strictly increasing. The family of BCBT models
uses objective function as the sum of individual objective
functions, which is strictly increasing with respect to ev-
ery coordinate, so the whole BCBT family is Pareto-ef-
ﬁcient.
Individual economic beneﬁts. The calculated contract
prices have been used to determine the individual bene-
ﬁts of the market participants. The list of their values has
not been included here because of the limited space of the
paper.
Absolute individual fairness – individual rationality. The
individual beneﬁts for those market participants, whose of-
fers have been successfully traded, are positive. So the
requirements of the individual rationality property are ful-
ﬁlled.
Relative individual fairness. The requirements for re-
lative fairness of individual market participants are par-
tially met in the test case. In general their fulﬁlment de-
pends on the implementation of solvers (e.g., the order of
identical market oﬀers may have impact on the volume of
their realization). The BCBT model itself does not have
any additional constraints for complying with these require-
ments.
Duration of market balancing. The total time of the mar-
ket balancing has been very short: 0.95 s. There have not
been any additional computation for resource pricing be-
cause the prices have been derived from the parameters of
the linear program solution. The LP formulation of the
BCBT model does not comprise integer variables, to it is
feasible even for large networks.
Number of exchanged messages. The market participants
have submitted 150 buy and 205 sell oﬀers – there are total
355 bid messages (the same number of messages covers
announcing the results of the trade).
6. Summary
The paper presents an attempt to develop a methodological
approach to the problem of comparing diﬀerent models for
trading capacity in the communication transport networks.
Several stages of test preparation and running computations
have been distinguished and described. The use of stan-
dardized data format is essential: the task of comparison
of results becomes easier and the same test cases can be
reused for many models. The proposed framework will be
used to study and compare the properties of diﬀerent trade
models, such as c-SeBiDA (combinatorial sellers’ bid dou-
ble auction) [12], MIDAS [13], BCBT [5], NSP (network
service provider) [14], and other new models developed
by the authors in their research. The described framework
and its tools can be a part of a broader research platform
forming an advanced computing environment for testing
the market models of resource allocation in communication
networks.
The evaluation framework is in its early stage and still there
is a need to reﬁne many of its elements. The most important
areas perceived for improvement include:
• The development and extension of economic mod-
els to describe the bandwidth demand and supply
enabling generation of test data reﬂecting the real
market conditions.
• Reﬁne the set of criteria enabling to study and
compare speciﬁc characteristics of trading models,
e.g., resulting from the market game between trade
participants.
These and other extensions of the basic methodology pro-
posed in this paper will be presented in the authors’ future
papers.
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